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ACADEMIC HIRING AND INEQUALITY
 
 
Center for the Sociology of Organizations  
Academic hiring, like all hiring processes, is a selection process that distinguishes 
candidates from each other. In higher education, access to a permanent position is 
essential, given that this allows candidates to cross over from the secondary to the 
primary labor market, meaning they can leave behind the insecurity of the 
secondary market and move into the security that the primary market offers.  
 Once in the secondary market, the hiring processes that move candidates from 
one permanent post to another have a very different function, as their purpose is no 
longer to “wall-off” access to the profession, but rather to differentiate among its 
members. This is notably the case when hiring allows upward mobility1, plucking 
the candidate from one category into another (going from maître de conférences2 to 
professeur3 in the case of France), or from an institution with a certain reputation to 
a more prestigious one (as is the case for much of American academic mobility).   
 Thus, these two mechanisms create inclusionary (and exclusionary) effects 
within the academic profession and categorize individuals. They create inequality 
by their very definition. Consequently, in this article we adopt the point of view of 
conventionalist authors (such as Marchal and Eymard-Duvernay 1997 and Bessy et 
al. 2001) who believe that there are no inequalities as such, but rather selection 
mechanisms which are, by convention, seen as legitimate or not, and are regardless 
the root of the exclusion/inclusion of certain categories of individuals on labor 
markets.   
 The actors involved perceive these inequalities as legitimate or not, and these 
perceptions vary with time and from one group to the next. Thus, a lot of research 
in the academic world, particularly that based on the Mertonian tradition (Cole and 
Cole 1973, Hagstrom 1965), highlights the fact that the happy few who are hired 
must, first and foremost, meet criteria of scientific excellence. If those hired have 
the best scientific performance, these authors believe that the recruitment process 
did not produce any inequalities. In other words, as long as the scientific 
meritocracy is respected, the status inequalities this process creates, by including 
some and excluding others, are deemed fair and justified. Herein is one of the 
principles for the creation of any meritocracy-based selection process as described 
                                                     
1  This is not the case for all mobility that transpires after entry into the profession. Some mobility 
occurs within one status category or institution.  
2  Translator’s note: a maître de conférences is roughly the equivalent of a tenured associate professor 
in the US. They hold a PhD and have passed a competitive examination and an interview with the 
hiring committee to obtain this position.  
3  Translator’s note: a professeur is roughly the equivalent of a full professor in the US. To become a 
professeur, one must pass the habilitation and the agrégation (a competitive examination), if one 
exists for the given field. Most professeurs were previously maîtres de conférences. 
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by M. Duru-Bellat (2009: 15): “La méritocratie privilégie l’égalité face aux règles 
de la sélection, en acceptant les inégalités de position auxquelles conduit la dite 
sélection” (Meritocracy favors equality in the face of the selection rules, by 
accepting the status inequalities this selection creates). 
 In the field of higher education and research, this principle is of particular 
importance, as any hiring mechanisms inspired by different principles are banished 
as soon as they are observed. Hence, the use of interpersonal networks, which is 
considered effective on other labor markets (Granovetter 1974), is regarded with 
suspicion on the academic market (Combes, Linnemer et Visser 2008), while the 
use of particularist rather than universal methods and criteria has been observed 
and denounced on a number of occasions.  
 However, the principle of meritocratic selection has not always been the only 
legitimate guiding principle. In the past, other criteria, such as social origin, 
ethnicity, religion, and political affiliation, weighed heavily on the process. 
Currently, the belief in the supremacy of scientific meritocracy is not unanimously 
shared even in the academic community (Musselin 2005). A number of actors want 
all academic tasks to be taken into account, and feel that commitment to 
pedagogical tasks and research advancement activities should be granted the same 
importance as traditional scientific production. Lastly, the inequalities created by a 
meritocratic selection process, i.e. difference in salary, status, etc. between those 
who obtain a permanent post and those who do not and thus work contractually, are 
also a subject of great debate and vary significantly from country to country.  
 In this chapter, we will not address the aforementioned debates, and we will also 
not declare what is legitimate and what is not. The task we have set out for 
ourselves is to identify the factors which move the line that separates those who 
have access to a position or a promotion and those who do not. We thus attempt to 
understand what makes one candidate be hired over another in the case of two 
equivalent candidates. To do so, four factors will be discussed.  
 Firstly, we will identify the fluctuations that affect hiring conditions. These 
variations make it such that out of two candidates with equal qualifications, one 
will be hired and the other not, depending on when they apply.  
 Secondly, we will look at the factors that make candidates not have the same 
opportunities to sit an interview and succeed. In view of this, we will address the 
creation of inequalities early in the hiring process, which have an impact on the 
results of this process.   
 Thirdly, we will look at hiring processes themselves, and their potential to be 
more or less discriminatory. Are the criteria used for evaluating scientific 
excellence neutral? Do they not create inequalities, as they cannot be met equally 
by all candidates?  
 Fourthly and lastly, we will look at the results of the hiring process and show 
that the profiles of hired candidates evolve over time, in other words, the “best” 
candidates have different characteristics at different points in time.  
 To illustrate these different sources of inequalities, we will use data on hiring 
and promotion to full professor status in the field of management in France. We 
will also use research on hiring committees (les commissions de spécialistes) and 
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on the agrégation competitive examination that we carried out as part of a research 
project financed by the French Department of Higher Education and the French 
Department of Agriculture (Carrère et al. 2004). We will rely heavily on the results 
of the TRAJUNI4 project, which is currently underway and is financed by the ANR 
(French National Research Council). This project studies career paths, from the 
1970s to the present, of French academics in management, physics, and history. 
This research is based on the comparative study of cohorts of academics hired in 
these three fields in 1976-1977, 1986-1987, 1996-1997 and 2006-2007, as well as 
on the analysis of management agrégation juries, since the creation of this 
examination in 1976. 
1. ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES VARY WITH TIME ACCORDING TO RATES OF 
PRESSURE  
The rate of pressure is one of the primary factors that create inequalities in access 
to academic jobs; this is defined as the variation in the number of applicants 
compared to the number of available positions. Some authors (namely L. Chauvel 
1998) highlighted generational inequalities and showed that, all else equal, 
opportunities for social advancement between two individuals vary according to 
the year they were born.  
 In higher education, generational variations do have a significant impact on 
inequalities. Periods of rapid growth in the student body, such as that in France at 
the beginning of the 1960s when baby boomers began enrolling in higher 
education, and then again from 1985-1995 due to the set objective of an 80% high 
school graduation rate, led to soaring demand for higher education positions, 
followed by equally radical periods of stagnation. There have often been calls to 
level-off these fluctuations in order to put an end to the “stop and go” phenomenon 
in academic hiring (cf. Quermonne Report, 1981), but to no avail. Thus, the pattern 
is one of prolific growth followed by lean years. Within a given period of this 
cycle, significant variations are also observed from one year to the next. The 
change in the number of enseignant-chercheur5 positions created between 1991 
and 2000 is proof of the major irregularities of the system, and shows how job 
creation is pegged to, but lags behind, changes in the student body. The number of 
dissertations defended over this period did not vary in any significant way.  
                                                     
4  This project is funded from 2007 to 2010. It is directed by C. Musselin (Center for the Sociology of 
Organizations, Sciences Po, and the CNRS), Frédérique Pigeyre (IRG, UPEC) and Maréva Sabatier 
(IREGE, Université de Savoie), who are respectively a sociologist, management scientist, and 
economist. The planning bureau (bureau d’études prévisionnelles) of the DGRH (Directorate 
General of Human Resources) of the French Higher Education and Research Department is also part 
of this project, through the work of Loïc Thomas, Marc Bideault, and Pasquin Rossi. Without their 
intimate knowledge and precise understanding of the available data on enseignants-chercheurs and 
the quality of the database that they created and analyzed, this project would never have been a 
success. We thus would like to warmly thank them for having agreed to participate in this research 
project.  
5  Translator’s note: the term enseignants-chercheurs designates full, associate and assistant professors 
who work in French public higher education, and are thus civil servants.   
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Changes in the number of positions created and in the student body from 1991-1998 (based 
on the Fréville Report 2001-2002 and data provided by the planning bureau of the DGRH of 
the French Department of Higher Education) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
# of positions created 1997 1484 2272 700 850 1118 948 1800 
change/year n-1  -0.6% 14% -70% 21% 31% -15% 90% 
Change in the student 
body 
6% 5% 6% 8% 3% 2% -1% -2% 
  
 In this graph, we can see that there is a distinct variability in the number of 
positions created6. This is due to a number of factors: population growth, as 
mentioned previously, but also budgetary considerations (public finances vary 
according to the economic situation and/or the political objectives of the 
government), labor union issues, and political changes (as was the case for the 
decision to grant permanent positions to adjunct faculty who had completed their 
dissertation in the beginning of the 1980s). 
 In the years for which we have quantified data on the number of positions 
available (created and vacant positions combined), we can see that the number of 
maître de conférences positions in management and all other disciplines taken 
together can rise or fall by more than 30% from one year to the next, and that a 
drop one year can be followed by a subsequent drop the following year. Doctoral 
students in management who finished their dissertation in 2006 and thus were on 
the labor market in 2007, 2008, and 2009 (positions 6, 7, and 8) were faced with 
more restrictive conditions than those who had their defense in 2005 and went on 
the market in 2006.  
 
                                                     
6  In his research on physics, R. Freeman (1979) observed the same phenomenon in the United States 
and revealed the existence of cobweb cycles: at first, the number of positions goes up and the 
salaries offered are higher, which leads to a rise in the number of doctorates, thus creating, with 
time, a glut in labor supply, and thus a drop in salaries and the number of positions available, which 
generates a drop in the appeal of a doctoral degree and a shortage of young doctorates, etc.  
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According to the Fréville Report (2001-2002), pages 27 and 29 
(1 = change between 2002 and 2001, 2= change between 2003 and 2002, 3= change 
between 2004 and 2003, 4= change between 2005 and 2004, 5= change between 2006 and 
2005, 6= change between 2007 and 2006, 7= change between 2008 and 2007, 8= change 
between 2009 and 2008) 
 
 Furthermore, on the following graph, we can see that the number of qualified 
applicants7 is on the rise: the national committees (les sections du comité national) 
which grant candidates their qualification8 don’t seem to take into account changes 
in the number of positions available. The number of qualified applicants in position 
2 (2003) went down despite the rise in the number of available positions in 1 
(2002). The number of qualified applicants then shoots up in 3 (2004) even though 
the number of available positions dropped in 2…  
                                                     
7  We cannot reliably calculate rates of pressure, simply because newly qualified applicants, a priori, 
make up only part of the pool of potential candidates for a given year, as candidates are qualified for 
a period of four years. We also cannot be certain that all qualified management candidates apply for 
positions in French universities. Some may use this qualification to apply for vacancies in the 
grandes écoles (elite institutions with competitive entrance exams).  
8  Translator’s note: This qualification is granted by a state body, the CNU (Conseil National des 
Universités), and is a prerequisite for applying to state school positions. 
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Graph drawn-up using data from the French Department of Higher Education and Research 
website, collected by the planning bureau of the DGRH (http://www.enseignementsup-
recherche.gouv.fr/cid22708/bilans-et-statistiques.html) 
 The line that separates “the deserving” from the others fluctuates widely and is 
more or less difficult to cross, depending on the year. This was true for 
management science, even though this field had grown more than most over the 
last three decades and suffered from a relative shortage of candidates, due to the 
competition between universities and grandes écoles on the one hand and academic 
and business careers on the other hand. Even in this particular case, chances of 
obtaining a position varied from one year to the next, even for otherwise equal 
candidates. This phenomenon is even more pronounced in a field like sociology, 
wherein Olivier Martin (2009) observed that the chances of getting hired were 
halved for young doctorates in the space of ten years (1998-2008).   
2. UPSTREAM MECHANISMS THAT IMPACT ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES  
Variations in hiring conditions thus reveal the existence of latent inequalities 
between candidates who apply at different times. Looking at candidates likely to be 
on the market in a given year, we observe that before the actual hiring process 
begins, there is a combination of site effects and self-selection mechanisms which 
have an impact on the future chances of a candidate being hired, regardless of 
his/her merits. These effects and mechanisms are present when candidates are  
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initially hired as maîtres de conférences, and when they make the transition to 
becoming a full professor. 
2.1 Site effects  
First of all, the institution where candidates do their doctoral work, as well as 
where they work as maîtres de conférences, has repercussions on access to a 
permanent position. This is evident when we look at where hired candidates did 
their graduate work. A small number of institutions produce the majority of 
doctorates in management, and these individuals are among those hired.  
 This holds true no matter the cohort, but the interviews conducted nuance this 
observation, and show how the role of the “site” variable varies with time. Thus, 
for the first cohorts, the site is first and foremost associated with a name, that of the 
dissertation supervisor: interpersonal ties formed with this professor were the 
primary source of support. In the 1970s and 1980s, doctorates indeed were not (or 
very rarely) part of a laboratory. The members of these cohorts emphasized their 
feeling of isolation whilst they were writing their dissertation.  
Professor X was nice – he was really busy as Economics director for the 
university. Not a specialist in the field. So he would meet with me when I 
asked, and he tried to give me useful advice, but really… I mean, I just ended 
up feeling really isolated.  
Question: Were you able to participate in seminars at the time?  
Oh right – no, they didn’t have those then. No – they definitely hadn’t started 
those yet. No. It’s really too bad, because I… we all felt really isolated. And I 
had some really inane problems – like it was really hard to get a desk where I 
could work. (maître de conférences, 1976-1977 cohort) 
 The young doctorates in these cohorts were not encouraged to publish and they 
weren’t aware of the rules of the hiring game. The determining factor at the time 
was the power supervisors had over access to jobs.  
At the time, it was really quite simple. My supervisor wanted me to get the 
assistant job, so he mentioned it to the director of the institute where I was. 
(Full Professor, 1976-1977 cohort) 
At the time, to become an assistant, it was nothing like it is now – it wasn’t 
easy to become an assistant somewhere else. It was really complicated! You 
had to have local support to get the job. (Full Professor, 1976-1977 cohort) 
 For the cohorts that followed, the role of the laboratory gradually became more 
important; it slowly emerged as a place of guidance and apprenticeship. Of course, 
there were still individuals in the last cohorts who wrote their dissertation in 
isolation, either by choice9 or because their university still did not have a structured 
                                                     
9  This is particularly the case of doctorates who begin their dissertation later in life: after a first career 
in the private sector or in higher education (as a high school teacher who also teaches in higher 
education, PRAG or PRCE status in France). 
ACADEMIC HIRING AND INEQUALITY 
8 
doctoral program, but generally the role of interpersonal relationships diminished. 
Subsequently, dissertation directors’ ability to procure a position for their advisees 
went down, while relationships developed within or without the laboratory, the 
awareness of which practices to adopt, and the skills learned by participating in the 
workings of the laboratory gave candidates, at the very least, the necessary toolkit 
to fulfill recruiters’ criteria. All of this, however, was by no means a way of 
guaranteeing access to a position. 
At university yes, not just to your supervisor. You would report on your 
progress by saying: “So, I’m at this point now, here’s what I plan to do next 
year.” You had to have a work plan. You couldn’t just hang around. We 
weren’t kids, you know! I mean, it was an effective system, and plus I had an 
advantage compared to my colleagues, because at the management lab people 
told me how important articles were. They would say “you have to write 
articles, more articles, do presentations, show us your work.” So I was really 
motivated! Because writing articles, I don’t know, I mean, in sociology it 
must be the same deal, go to conferences, write articles, revise them, publish 
them, it’s a job, it’s a craft, it’s know-how. (maître de conférences, 2006-
2007 cohort) 
 Those who are encouraged and supported by a laboratory are better informed of 
the rules of the game and are more adept at strategically approaching the work 
market. Among these individuals, two candidate profiles emerge. On the one hand, 
“individualists” who work in structured laboratories, are supported by their 
supervisor, and use the laboratory to network and find a position. On the other 
hand, there are individuals who try to integrate into a laboratory in hopes of 
obtaining a permanent position there. Individuals who are more isolated must learn 
the rules of the game on their own: they often apply all over the place their first 
year, without forming ties with the departments that are hiring, and typically don’t 
get hired. Their second year, they adopt a more targeted approach, and take care to 
apply for positions for which they are well matched.  
 Site effects also play a role during the transition to becoming a full professor, 
and in particular during the period of preparation for the agrégation competitive 
examination. Some departments “push” their young maîtres de conférences to sit 
the agrégation, encourage them to publish, and even lighten their teaching 
workload or share of collective responsibilities to give them time to prepare for the 
higher education agrégation examination. To prepare, they must not only review 
the material and prepare a written application, but they must also prepare 
“lessons,” i.e. speeches they will have to deliver in front of the jury. Some go on a 
“tour de France,” from institution to institution to practice their “lesson” in front of 
different professors. They use this as an opportunity to prepare one part of the 
examination, to develop or strengthen their professional network, and to make 
themselves known. These “lessons” are very time and budget consuming, and are 
much easier to organize with the support of the department.  
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 The size and composition of the department also play a role. Teams of “maîtres 
de conférences candidates” are formed in large departments, which make it 
possible for the candidates to prepare together. 
I worked mostly alone, but at the IAE, Professor X had organized… because 
I wasn’t the only candidate from the university: there were others who were 
going to sit the exam, so he organized lessons. So I participated in a few 
preparatory lessons.  
Question: With your colleagues as well?  
Yes. There was – who was there at the time? I can’t remember their names. 
There were two from IAE, A… I think it was A… and B… who were sitting 
the exam as well. There was also a someone from the IUT who was sitting 
the exam as well, C…, if I remember correctly. So they organized lessons. 
(Bert, maître de conférences 06-07) 
 In addition, the chances of a maître de conférences finding one or many 
professors with the same specialty who would be willing to advise and help the 
candidate practice are much higher in large departments. A number of people 
mentioned how important it was to be able to exchange ideas with a faculty advisor 
to prepare for the exam. 
2.2 Self-selection 
The inclination to go on the market is also different from one candidate to the next, 
whatever their merits. This is obvious from the outset, when a candidate applies for 
a first job, as all candidates do not apply for all the positions for which they are 
qualified.  Initially, instead of making decisions based on the scientific interest of a 
given department, candidates tend to prefer positions that are in geographic 
proximity. Some candidates will even dramatically restrict their applications based 
on constraints which are personal, more often than not.  
I had also applied to Lyon, but, you know, I had applied mostly in the region 
because I have kids. I wasn’t prepared to go to Rennes or just anywhere. 
(maître de conférences 1976-1977) 
I had applied to Angers, Nantes, and somewhere else I think… Where was it? 
There were a number of positions available in Angers… oh that’s right! I 
applied to several positions in Angers, two positions, and one in Nantes. 
That’s right – no more!   
Question: Always based on geographic criteria so that you could stay in the 
region?  
Precisely. (maître de conférences 1996-1997) 
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 The geographic mobility requirement (and the refusal to accept this 
requirement) was also often invoked by those, from the 2006-2007 cohort10, who 
systematically criticized the agrégation.11 This was the case of eight members of 
this cohort that we interviewed, and of those eight, the ones who decided not to 
apply for the agrégation were extremely critical of it. The latter objected to the 
principal of the geographic mobility requirement and claimed their “right to 
immobility.” Often, maîtres de conférences from the other cohorts also held this 
point of view.  
At the end of the day, there was something else as well, which I think played 
a role. I didn’t really want to go anywhere other than Paris.  
Question: Alright. You didn’t want to live and work in two different places? 
Well… I just didn’t really want… I don’t have anything against schools 
outside Paris. It’s just that my husband is self-employed, and his work is 
based in Paris, his clientele is in Paris. You have to realize that I had done the 
commute from Nancy to Paris. I managed, but I was scattered and exhausted. 
So I didn’t really want to do that again, because I already knew what that was 
like. But I’ve got nothing against the universities outside Paris. I just couldn’t 
stand the commute. And this idea that you’re never at home, always working 
out of a suitcase, always on the road, just doesn’t appeal to me. (maître de 
conférences 96-97) 
 Among the professors who passed the agrégation, other potential self-selection 
mechanisms emerge, congruent with those that Carrère et al. (2004) observed in 
their work on gender-based discrimination. In our interviews with full professors, 
we often noticed that some had not initially built their career around the 
agrégation, but the opposite was also true. These individuals sat the agrégation 
only on the suggestion of colleagues, who pointed out their abilities and 
encouraged them to give the examination a try. In our sample, this was more often 
the case of women than men. This could just be a matter of chance, but we cannot 
dismiss the hypothesis of women’s underestimation of their own abilities, or their 
tendency to overestimate the difficulty of the exam. Thus, Carrère et al. (2004) 
observed that women who became research directors at the INRA (a French 
national research institution) had much greater scientific credentials than the men 
when they first applied, as if they thought the bar was much higher than the men 
did. Among the candidates for the higher education agrégation (who are typically 
30 to 40 years old), we found that there were twice as many male as female 
candidates.  
                                                     
10  This cohort is interesting on this point because it was composed of maîtres de conférences who had 
two years of experience at the time the interviews were conducted, and thus could not cite 
geographic mobility as an a posteriori explanation for not becoming full professors.  
11  The primary criticism, even from those who saw the agrégation as a necessary step which they 
should get out of the way as quickly as possible, was directed at the way this exam is carried out. 
The cohort members objected to the selection mechanism itself, as they felt that the ranking system 
and the ability to pass the exam were more based on political bargaining than on the intrinsic merit 
of the candidates.  
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 Thus, the ideal of equal opportunity falls prey to numerous mechanisms in this 
process. Above and beyond the social or cultural status of an individual (which we 
were able to control for during the interviews), coming from a “good scientific 
family” had a significant impact on candidates’ opportunities. This family is one 
which knows the rules of the system well and passes them on to “its children,” or 
which gives them the best possible conditions for their success. The fact of being 
welcomed into a laboratory that has the necessary resources (including material 
resources to, for example, lighten the teaching burden during the preparation period 
for the agrégation) is an advantage, just as it is to be born into a family with high 
social and cultural capital. Individual factors (greater or lesser leeway in terms of 
mobility, more or less self-confidence) compound the status effects and give us a 
deeper understanding of the diverse individual trajectories we observed. 
3.  HIRING MECHANISMS THAT PRODUCE INEQUALITIES 
A third factor that can influence access to a career in higher education is linked to 
the impartiality of hiring processes. If scientific merit (or any other criteria) is 
deemed legitimate, then the question is the following: is the hiring process fair, or 
does it create (or tacitly sanction) discrimination? 
 In a recently published article, C. Musselin and F. Pigeyre (2008) conclude that 
hiring committees (les commissions de spécialistes), if their members are diverse, 
mostly succeed at preventing direct discrimination. The presence of women on 
these committees, the fact that the process is collective and somewhat publicized, 
and the increasing use of more formal procedures, make it possible to limit (but 
never entirely eliminate) discriminatory practices. Thus, neither the research we 
carried out on management agrégation juries (based on a quantitative analysis of 
applications and candidates since the creation of this examination and interviews 
with jury members), nor that carried out on management hiring committees and on 
qualification decisions made by Section 06 (Management Sciences) of the CNU 
(Conseil National des Universités), revealed blatant gender-based discrimination. 
Hence, the women who apply have the same chances as men of passing the 
agrégation and the interviews did not reveal overt discriminatory behavior, while 
the percentage of women who apply for the maîtres de conférences qualification is 
equal or less than the previous years’ percentage of qualified or hired women (cf. 
graph below). In the field of management, women apply for qualification more 
than men and are more likely to be hired subsequently12. 
Percentage of women among candidates for qualification, those qualified and hired from 
section 6 (Management Sciences) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
                                                     
12  We would of course need statistics on candidates and hiring for the grandes écoles of management 
to see if they have similar results, or if there are in fact more women who apply to universities 
because their hire rate is lower in the écoles. Unfortunately these statistics are not available.  
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% of women among qualification 
candidates 
43% 51% 44% 48% 54% 
% of women among those who 
receive their qualification 
48% 53% 49% 52% 56% 
Women’s success rate (# who 
receive qualification / # of 
applications) 
49% 45% 52% 71% 62% 
      
% of women among the maîtres de 
conférences hired* 
54% 53% 53% 64% 68% 
*Note that we do not know the % of women among the candidates for a given position, as 
this % is not the same as the % of women qualified, since the qualification lasts 4 years.  
Calculations based on data from the French Department of Higher Education and Research 
website. 
 
 However, in the article mentioned above, the two authors remark that it is 
difficult to entirely prevent the risk of direct discrimination. On the one hand, it is 
difficult for hiring mechanisms to take into account inequalities which are linked to 
differences in candidates’ respective trajectories. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
overcome recruiters’ unconscious preconceptions and stereotypes which make 
them prefer candidates similar to themselves, and they therefore tend to reproduce 
preexisting social and cultural inequalities. And finally, it must be noted that 
network effects can have weigh heavily on the hiring process.  
 Among the latter, the one that is most well-known and denounced currently is 
“localism,” meaning the hiring of young doctorates who were trained in the hiring 
institution (Godechot and Louvet 2008; Musselin and Sabatier 2008). This practice 
allows recruiters to remediate uncertainties regarding the work contract that are 
inherent to the hiring process. These uncertainties are particularly pronounced13 for 
the non-scientific evaluation aspects of the candidate: pedagogical abilities, 
personality, and potential as a future colleague. Thus, when scientific criteria are 
granted less importance, chances are good that the recruiters will hire someone that 
they know and trust. This is, of course, perceived as distributive injustice (Cadin 
and Guérin 2003) by those who feel that only scientific merit should matter (Lazar 
2001). 
 Another network effect is sometimes made manifest in a form of “pre-hiring:” 
this consists of deciding who will be hired long before the interviews. This 
phenomenon has grown increasingly infrequent with time, but is typical 
nonetheless of situations where a professor is able to use his/her influence to “give” 
a position to a young candidate.  
So the following year I tried again. This time, I had a bit more information. I 
had friends who told me they could probably help me out a bit. I was in 
                                                     
13  As C. Musselin (2005) showed, recruiters have a lot more information on the candidate’s scientific 
credentials than on other aspects, and also give more credence to these scientific considerations.  
ACADEMIC HIRING AND INEQUALITY 
13 
contact with professor X, and he said: “Look, I can guarantee you a position, 
but there’s one condition – don’t apply to the IAE, apply to the IUT.” 
They’re the same university. I said deal, I applied, and I got the job. (maître 
de conférences, 1996-1997 cohort). 
 Lastly, other network effects, less visible and thus less frequently condemned, 
were updated through research carried out on candidates, successful and not, for 
the management agrégation (Pigeyre and Sabatier, forthcoming). This work laid 
bare the variables that determine, when all else is equal, whether or not a candidate 
passes the agrégation. This revealed that candidates whose PhD supervisor is on 
their jury are twice as likely to succeed14. The “supervisor” effect is only one of 
many network effects, and it is the only one that can be measured statistically15, but 
the interviews show that there are a number of others, e.g. the presence of a 
candidate’s mentor on the agrégation or habilitation jury.  
4. THE CHANGING PREFERENCES OF RECRUITERS 
The last factor that we identified pertains to the changing preferences of recruiters, 
as evidenced by a comparison of the profiles of the hirees. Thus, inequalities of 
access to higher education careers are not solely linked to the number of available 
positions. These inequalities are also related to the changing preferences of 
recruiters over time. To prove this, we will compare the characteristics of first-time 
hirees for permanent positions (maîtres de conférences and full professors16) in the 
field of management in 1976-1977 (15 individuals), 1986-1987 (43 individuals), 
1996-1997 (166 individuals), and 2006-2007 (178 individuals). This analysis 
indubitably reveals elements of stability and change. 
 If we look at all the people concerned when a given position becomes available 
(402 individuals between 1976 and 2006), 53% were men of nearly 34 years of age 
who had obtained a doctorate in the two years prior, 75% had already published, 
87% had a doctorate in management, and 71% were hired by an institution other 
than the one where they got their doctorate, but which was often (47% of the time) 
in the same city.   
Descriptive data on academics hired in 76-77, 86-87, 96-97, 2006-2007. 
Cohorts Total 1976-77 1986-87 1996-97 
2006-
2007 
Women 0.47 0.40 0.16 0.48 0.54 
Age when hired for their first position 33.97 32.00 41.44 32.47 33.72 
                                                     
14  Combes, Linnemer and Visser (2008) came to similar conclusions regarding the economics 
agrégation. 
15  Thanks to the SUDOC database which near-systematically collects information on dissertations 
defended and supervisors.  
16  It is indeed possible to enter an academic career directly as a full professor, without having been a 
maître de conférences previously.  
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Hired directly as a full professor 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.01 
Time elapsed between dissertation and hiring 1.92 2.67 5.81 1.13 1.80 
Had already published before being hired 0.76 0.33 1.42 0.47 0.92 
Dissertation in management 0.87 0.17 0.57 0.92 0.94 
Hired by the institution where they did their
doctoral work 0.29 0.80 0.24 0.26 0.30 
Hired in the same city where doctorate was
obtained 0.47 0.82 0.46 0.42 0.51 
Observations 401 15 43 165 178 
 
 This average profile changes if we compare the different cohorts to each other. 
Recently hired individuals have different characteristics from those of the first 
cohorts. The only element which seems to have remained relatively stable over 
time is the access age, as it remains around 33 to 34 years, with one notable 
exception: 1986-1987 when the average age was 4117. But as access age remains 
relatively the same over time, a number of other aspects change.  
 Firstly, the number of women among the candidates hired goes up: women 
represented 54.5% of hires in 2006-2007 versus 40%, 18% and 49% respectively in 
the first three cohorts. 
 Secondly, direct access to a position as full professor becomes increasingly rare, 
representing respectively 7%, 9%, 2% and 1% of each cohort. Individuals in this 
situation are on average older (40 years old) than those who begin as maîtres de 
conférences. We can hypothesize that these individuals had a different career prior 
to entering higher education, but we do not have quantified data to back this up.  
 Once again leaving aside the 1986-1987 cohort, which has its own specific 
characteristics, we observe that new hires were increasingly likely to have 
published before being hired. Only 33% of those hired in 1976 had already 
published once, versus 47% in 1996 and 92% in 2006. 
 In addition, new hires were increasingly likely to have defended a dissertation in 
management. This is by no means surprising: this discipline is relatively new in 
France (Chessel and Pavis, 2001) and management scientists hired in the 1970s had 
primarily studied economics, as training in management was still in its infancy at 
the time. Only 17% of new hires had a doctorate in management in 1976 versus 
94% today and 92% as early as 1996.  
 Finally, a distinct drop in localist practices can be observed. The decline is 
dramatic between the first two cohorts, as the percentage of hires having defended 
their dissertation in the institution which subsequently hired them went from 80% 
to 24%, and that of those staying in the same city where they had written their 
dissertation went from 82% to 46%. Here again, 1986 seems to be an exceptional 
case, but nonetheless the 1976 numbers were never reached again by the last two 
cohorts. In 2006, only 30% of new hires had written their dissertation in the 
                                                     
17  It seems that this “anomaly” is linked to a decision to grant permanent positions to adjunct 
professors who had completed their dissertation. These individuals, who had been waiting for a 
position for a number of years, were thus able to join the maîtres de conférences corps. 
ACADEMIC HIRING AND INEQUALITY 
15 
institution where they were hired, and 51% in the same city (versus 26% and 42% 
respectively in 1996). 
 If we compare the average profile of new hires in 1976 to that of new hires in 
2006, two different individuals emerge. In 1976, it was a young man (32 years old) 
who had obtained his doctorate in a field other than management and had not yet 
published. In 2006, it was a young woman of nearly 34 years of age, with a 
doctorate in management obtained in the two years prior and with publications 
already under her belt, and she is recruited by a university other than the one in 
which she defended her dissertation.  
 The first conclusion to be drawn from these results is that, contrary to what is 
typically written about changes in the academic profession, the trajectory of those 
who obtain permanent positions today obeys traditional academic models and 
follows a distinctly organizational path: new hires have written a dissertation in the 
discipline for which they are hired and publish in journals of this discipline, after 
having following a rather standardized path (a dissertation at a young age, a 
position a short time after the dissertation). The comparison that we are currently 
carrying out with profiles from other disciplines (history and physics) will allow us 
to see if this situation is linked to the fact that the field of management is new and 
progressively being “institutionalized,” or rather if this is a more widespread 
phenomenon, which would lead us to call into question research heralding more 
boundaryless careers in higher education. (Enders 2001, Baruch and Hall 2004, 
Kaulisch and Enders 2005). 
5. CONCLUSION 
Instead of concentrating on the principles that govern access to the academic 
profession and their fairness, if we look at factors that, when all else is equal, give 
two candidates different results at the end of the hiring process, we are able to 
identify four phenomena that have an impact on equality of opportunity for those 
wishing to access an academic career.  
 Two of these factors are linked to application timing. Thus, pressure rates for a 
position are not static and depend on the number of available positions as well as 
the number of candidates at any given time. As a result, more or less favorable 
periods can be identified. On the other hand, the changes in profiles described in 
the previous section lead us to conclude that candidates who would have been hired 
in period t would not have been in t+n because recruiter preferences would no 
longer be the same (namely because the supply of candidates itself would have 
changed).  
 The two other factors are different in nature. On the one hand, they are linked to 
candidates’ preparation conditions. As A. Coulon, R. Ennafaa and S. Paivandi 
(2001) clearly showed in their study on the future of allocataires-moniteurs 
(doctoral candidates with a three year fellowship and some teaching duties), some 
preparatory courses make it easier to obtain an ATER position (Attaché 
Temporaire d’Enseignement et de Recherche – an adjunct professorship of one 
year only renewable once), which in turn makes it easier to secure a permanent 
ACADEMIC HIRING AND INEQUALITY 
16 
position. In the same way, we noticed that candidates who were well integrated 
into their laboratories and networks were able to gain better access to good 
information and were more familiar with the practices and rules of the game. 
Whereas previously (in the first cohorts), supervisors’ ability to find their advisees 
permanent positions played a central role, going through a standardized and 
collective preparation process has currently become an additional advantage. 
 However, hiring processes and the greater or lesser role played therein by direct 
or indirect discrimination, also have an effect on the candidates’ equality of 
opportunity and whether or not legitimate selection criteria will be respected.  
 Generational inequalities, indirect discrimination produced by the process itself, 
unequal access to resources which prevent candidates from applying in the best 
possible conditions, and lastly inequalities in the way selection criteria are applied, 
all of these factors combined change, over time, where the line between included 
and excluded is drawn, and also make it more or less easy to cross that line for 
those who wish to be included at any given time. The feeling of injustice that is 
born when one was not in the right place at the right time does not so much call 
into question the selection principles themselves, but rather calls on us to make 
sure that they are applied in a more rigorous fashion. In other words, the scarcer the 
available positions, the more distributive injustice becomes intolerable.  
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